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Abstract
This paper searches for the origins of the relatively successful performance of Hoogovens, the only sizeable steel
firm in the Netherlands. It is suggested that Hoogovens has at critical moments benefited substantially from both
strategic and financial support,  but was basically left to decide its own policies. Luckily, it mostly opted for
‘right’ policies so that the industry’s decline hit less hard in the Netherlands than elsewhere thus making it less
necessary to develop emergency programmes. More specifically, Hoogovens chose to diversify into the
aluminium market at a relatively early stage, and it broke up its merger with Germany’s Hoesch. However,
Hoogovens also benefited from the Polder Model’s emphasis on wage restraint as much of the firm’s output is
exported. Moreover, corporatist welfare arrangements allowed Hoogovens to shed labour without causing
extraordinary unrest. It is concluded that the success of ‘laissez-faire intervention’ heavily depends on the
qualities of the supported firm’s management. Polder-type governance in terms of wages and labour has
beneficial effects in the short run, may but retard innovation.
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2Introduction
Just before the turn of the century, British Steel acquired one of the best performing European
steel producers of the late-1990s, Hoogovens of the Netherlands. While only less than half its
size in terms of sales, and only just a bit larger than a third in terms of steel production,
Hoogovens realised net returns of DGL 415 mln as against DGL 697 mln for British Steel
(BS) in 1998 (for some basic indicators on Hoogovens, see Appendix Table A).2 Preliminary
figures on the first six months of 1999 even indicate that BS suffered a loss of DGL 600 mln,
while Hoogovens made profits of DGL 200 mln. Provided that the newly formed firm will be
able to wrench synergy from the merger, which in view of the generally negative performance
effects of large mergers is far from certain (see Schenk, 2000), BS may well have realised a
move that will strengthen its position within the industry as the new firm, now listed under the
name of Corus, has cornered Europe’s no. 1 and the world’s no. 3 spot (see Table 1).
***Table 1 about here***
The fact that Hoogovens is virtually synonymous to Dutch steel offers a unique opportunity to
find out to what extent its relative success in weathering through the sector’s decline can be
explained either by Dutch forms of governance or by firm-specific causes such as ‘quality of
management’.3 In this paper, I will not be able to address this question in full. However, I will
examine parts of the evidence by discussing several competencies of Hoogovens as a firm and
by reviewing elements of Dutch industrial policy in general as well as pertaining to steel. 4 The
                                                
2At the time of writing, DGL 1 » Euro 0.5.
3 To be more precise, there is one other steel firm in the Netherlands, Nedstaal. Established in 1938, it was taken
over by Thyssen from Germany but regained its independence in 1998. Total production of Nedstaal is estimated
at approx. 3-6 per cent of Hoogovens’s. Its main input is scrap steel. Demka, the first Dutch commercial
manufacturer of steel (founded in 1915) became a fully owned Hoogovens susbsidiary in 1964 but its mills were
closed down in 1983. In addition, one of the largest and most acquisitive steel makers in the world, Ispat
International, is incorporated in Amsterdam and quoted at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange as well as Wall
Street, but it has no operating subsidiaries in the Netherlands. Ispat is a subsidiary of LNM Group, headquartered
in the UK.
4 Large parts of Hoogovens’s history as a firm have been documented exhaustively; see De Vries (1968) and
especially Dankers and Verheul (1993). Since the latter overlaps the former, I was able to rely on the latter only;
3paper begins in the following section with a discussion of the industrial policy setting in order
to establish what Polder-type governance entails. The two subsequent sections will be more
directly focused on Hoogovens itself. In the longitudinal perspective taken, I have chosen
1982 as a cut-off point as Hoogovens abandoned its merger with Hoesch and had to make a
new start as an independent firm in that year. The paper concludes with a preliminary
assessment of the role that governance played in Hoogovens’s success and therefore amounts
to an assessment of success or failure in Dutch governance.
Industrial policy setting
The Netherlands has a tradition of economic liberalism that goes back as far as the late-
sixteenth and seventeenth century when this country—following its dependence on
international trade with its colonies—established itself as arguably the most liberal country of
Europe (Van Zanden, 1999).5 Throughout the second half of the 20th century, this liberal
orientation survived although the government at times was willing enough to lend support to
certain firms. A rather peculiar characteristic of the Dutch model of liberal governance was
the gradual increase of tripartite consultations and a deliberate and government-led focus on
wage restraint culminating in the by now rather famous Wassenaar agreement of 1982.
Tripartite consensus-building only decreased in importance during the late-1980s and 1990s,
when the economy appeared to be on a steady growth trajectory again and new-economy
individualism began to manifest itself.
Pre-war origins. The economic crisis of the 1930s had initiated the first steps towards what
was to become a more intimate government involvement with industry during the post-World
War II industrialisation process. The crisis also challenged the labour movement to come up
with alternative ideas on development. Unions started to collaborate with regional and local
governments in order to foster and guide industrial development, among others by helping to
set up semi-public industrial banks as well as so-called Economic-Technological Institutes
that were to map the routes of industrialisation. These initiatives were all grounded in what
was called ‘engineer’s socialism’, i.e. the idea that smart engineers would be able to select
                                                                                                                                                        
see the appropriate references in the text. Information concerning Hoogovens that is not referenced is taken from
the steel archives of GRASP Research (Erasmus University Rotterdam) that mainly consist of newspaper
clippings from NRC Handelsblad; de Volkskrant; het Financieele Dagblad; Financial Times; and the Economist.
5 The term ‘liberal’ is used in its European meaning, i.e. as an ideology that is definitely pro free markets.
4and/or develop projects that were financially feasible if only their social returns were included
in investment calculations. However, in the end these initiatives were quite unsuccessful as
the government hesitated to proceed to full-fledged support for fear of being accused of
preferential treatments (Tellegen and Brouwer, 1998). Yet, this involvement of labour unions
in industrial development sowed the first seeds of post-World War II industrial policy
corporatism by making the unions an accepted party to industrial policy consultations.
Post-war industrialisation (1940s-1960s). Following World War II, the government while
formally retaining a non-interventionist approach, laid down several industrialisation policy
papers in which it was announced that the industrialisation of the Netherlands should be
pursued with determination and led by the development of basic industries such as chemicals
and steel. A policy of guided wages was initiated immediately after the war. It was to be
effective almost unopposed and without significant changes until 1959, and it has been
observed that no other system of administered wage determination did as well for an equally
long period of time (Windmuller, 1969; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Around 1960, wages
were an estimated 20 to 25 per cent below those in Germany and Belgium. The guided wage
policy’s very success in terms of continuity during the 1950s became, however, its undoing in
the 1960s when wages exploded in order to make up for lost purchasing power.
The industrialisation targets that were put forward were to be realised by means of
self-serving and independent business firms. The government was not to interfere with private
considerations, certainly not in terms of selective (specific) intervention. Yet, some
experiments in industrial policy were undertaken, according to Van Zanden (1999) probably
just because schemes for future spending had to be made in order to qualify for Marshall Aid
funds.
Thus, and apart from the usual generic tax facilities, substantial financial support was
granted to such firms as AKZO's predecessor Koninklijke Zout, the chemical divisions of
DSM, Shell's Pernis refinery, and also Hoogovens. All these firms are still major players in
the Dutch economy. A Reconstruction Bank (Herstelbank), with the government as the
majority shareholder, was set up to channel parts of this support. Private shareholders, mainly
banks and institutional investors, were to obtain a government-guaranteed return of 3.5 per
cent on their investments. Occasionally, the state took part in private firms, but such stakes
remained quite small. Industrialisation as such, however, was high on the agenda of Dutch
politics. Together with full-fledged promotion campaigns and government-enforced wage
restraints, this pointed the Dutch economy in a direction that was to benefit Hoogovens as this
5firm was increasingly focusing on export markets.
Specific state intervention only started to become more apparent by the end of the
1960s when several industries as well as large firms turned into decline, or as in the case of
regions, appeared not to be able to catch up. One such region was in the north-eastern part of
the Netherlands, that is close to the sea. It was here that Hoogovens participated in a joint
venture to set up an aluminium industry backed by long-term guarantees of low-cost supply of
energy (see below). Already in 1967, similar facilities were granted to the French aluminium
firm Péchiney in order to seduce it into setting up smelter facilities in another relatively
backward coastal region, this time in the south-west. Together, these two firms eventually
made the Netherlands into Europe’s largest exporter of this non-ferrous metal.
The 1970s and 1980s. As in other countries, industrial policy during the 1970s and early
1980s came to focus more heavily on the support of declining industries and particularly of
individual so-called leading firms. Its ways and means were similar too (Schenk, 1987). First,
financial support was only rarely conditioned on strategic restructuring and replacements of
incumbent management teams. Thus, decline was almost exclusively seen as an inevitable
consequence of unfavourable economic circumstances, in spite of abundant evidence of
management failure and inadequate managerial practices. Consequently, ‘temporary’ support
by means of subsidies meant to bridge the difficult times was legitimate. Secondly, Dutch
industrial policy sought to improve the fate of declining firms and industries by pressing for
mergers and acquisitions. Vested beliefs in the force of scale economies led to the creation, in
1972, of a Restructuring Corporation (Nehem, similar to the IRC in Great Britain) which was
given the explicit task to forge mergers and acquisitions among medium-sized firms. Due to
insufficient follow-up support, the Nehem largely remained ineffectual.
However, large-scale concentrations were more directly encouraged (or even
concocted) by the Ministry of Economic Affairs—with sometimes disastrous effects. Thus,
billions of public money were spent on firms that eventually went bankrupt (or almost so)
nevertheless. RSV Shipbuilders became a landmark case of ineffectual and inefficient
industrial policy (Wassenberg, 1983). Encouraged by the government, several shipbuilders
merged to become RSV in 1971, were granted more than 2.5 billion DGL in subsidies during
the following ten years, but allowed to continue their woefully inadequate management
practices. After several phases of demerger, and a suspension of all payments in 1983, the
firm was finally liquidated in 1993. The RSV-case became the standard ‘proof’ of the
impossibility of specific industrial policy and was invoked time and again to criticise ongoing,
6or preclude requested support measures. It never occurred to the policy makers that, in fact,
the rescue operation failed because it was sought via merger. However, in some important
cases public funds did allow firms to overcome cyclical downturns, among them Hoogovens
(Dercksen and Schenk, 1982).
Meanwhile, a tightly knit corporatist network had evolved on the basis of the post-war
co-habitation of market and planning ideologies. Thus, when unions and employers, watched
over closely by the government, concluded the wage-restraint-in-return-for-work agreement
of Wassenaar in 1982, generally seen as the ‘official’ beginnings of the Polder Model, the
same parties had already met to discuss the implications of a novel approach to industrial
policy that had just been advocated by an authoritative advisory committee (WRR, 1980). I
will return to this below.
For now, Dutch industrial policy did not endeavour to work according to some
elaborate sort of industry blue print. The institutions of industrial policy were mainly meant to
offer financial backing against unfavourable conditions, sometimes in the form of government
subsidies, sometimes in the form of small state holdings, and sometimes in the form of
government-backed loans. The more it became evident that many firms were not able to
manage themselves through adverse economic conditions, including several of the biggest
multinationals, the more subsidies increased. The late-1970s and early-1980s became the high
era of government subsidies to industry. In none of these cases was the support conditioned
on a substantial increase of government control over firm decision making.
Such subsidies were debated quite vigorously. The debate was basically between those
who argued that subsidies were given to the wrong firms on the one hand, and those who
argued against government subsidies tout court as those subsidies prevented the market
mechanism from fulfilling its cleansing tasks. The first argument was most forcefully put
forward by an advisory committee of the independent WRR-thinktank, led by a social-
democratic professor of economics, Arie Van der Zwan (WRR, 1980).6 According to the
                                                
6 The ‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’ (literally: Scientific Advisory Council on Government
Policy) was formed in 1972. Though initiated by the government, and founded by a Royal decree (enforced by
law in 1976), it is an independent advisory body with a relatively small staff but ample opportunities to recruit ad
hoc experts. Its task is to focus especially on long-term developments by means of applied research. Together
with the SER (Social and Economic Council, a tripartite advisory body founded in 1950) and the Centraal
Planbureau (CPB, founded in 1945 to develop forecasts and plans on the basis of large econometric models of
the Dutch economy, now a more general bureau for economic policy analysis), it is one of the most reputed and
important advisory bodies in the Netherlands.
7WRR, support should be given to selected sun-rise industries and firms, instead of sun-set,
smoke-stack industries. Since the latter largely coincided with low value-added industrial
activities, the WRR also argued for turning around those manufacturing firms that were
focusing on basic product markets.
The WRR suggestions became effectively buried when the government appointed an
assessment committee in which business interests were over-represented. Although the
importance of moving the Dutch economy into high-tech industries was upheld, the
committee, which after its chairman G.A. Wagner (a former Shell CEO) was unofficially
known as the Wagner-committee, stressed again the importance of wage restraint and free
markets. On the one hand, this changed most of what was to remain of industrial policy into
technology policy under which a broad collection of relatively small-scale support
programmes was born. On the other hand, it started to lead the Dutch away from the
traditional corporatist way of consensus-building, and towards the Anglo-Saxon veneration of
deregulation and privatisation (see Hulsink and Schenk, 1998).
Interestingly, this did not eliminate the granting of large-scale financial support to a
handful of large firms that were perceived as important to the Dutch economy. As will be
seen below, one of those firms was, again, Hoogovens. Others were Philips, Volvo, Daf-
Trucks, and Fokker.7 The interventionist, subsidy-focused part of the Dutch governance
model receded only when the international 1990s boom appeared to be persistent, and
subsidies consequently became superfluous.
As Table 2 demonstrates, the Wassenaar-agreement was quite effective in slowing
                                                
7 In the 1990s the Dutch government came up with a quite innovative solution for channelling funds into private
firms, the so-called technolease scheme (see Hulsink and Schenk, 1998). This facility was applied most
conspicuously though at first secretively in the Fokker drama (1994) and as an emergency backing for Philips (1993).
Under this scheme, which is equivalent to the sale-and-lease-back schemes which are widely used for tangible assets,
a firm sells (part of) its as yet undepreciated know-how to another firm, usually a bank, upon which it is leased from
this other firm. The latter enjoys considerable tax benefits as the purchasing costs can be deducted from profits, while
the former immediately receives a substantial cash flow. Evidently, the scheme is most attractive if the former firm’s
profits are not sufficient to allow full depreciation while the latter firm’s profits are. The indirect state subsidy
amounts to the opportunity loss as a result of lower and/or postponed tax collections. The gross cash flows for the
two firms mentioned alone amounted to at least one billion euro but perhaps to as much as 1.7 billion euro whereas
the attendant risks were largely covered by complex vice-versa payments and put-option clauses. The facility became
subject of controversy between the European Commission and the Dutch government but was found acceptable in
1999.
8down wage growth. For almost any year, standard disposable income growth trailed
productivity increase. While real productivity increased by 3.8 per cent in 1994, standard
disposable income even decreased by 0.4 per cent. During 1984-1996, the real costs of labour
in the private sector grew with only a meagre 0.8 per cent annually. Table 3 demonstrates that
the Dutch policy of wage restraint, indeed, caused wages to increase again much less than in
other countries.
***Table 2 about here***
***Table 3 about here***
Summarising, the first thirty-five years of post-World War II Dutch governance were
characterised by the gradual build-up of a corporatist system for which the foundations were
already laid during the pre-war years. The government consistently, and apart from a wage
explosion during the 1960s successfully, compelled and later urged unions and employers to
moderate wages as this was thought to result in the build-up of a strong industrial base via
investment of the proceeds. Firms were encouraged to attain larger scale by means of mergers
and acquisitions, while the government at the same time kept a blind eye to, or even triggered
the rise of many cartel-like arrangements (see De Jong, 1990). Although the cycle of subsidies
to industry in the Netherlands was not much different from that in other EU (or even OECD)
countries, the extent of subsidies has always been moderate in a comparative sense (Schenk,
1993).
The Dutch model as it prevailed until the early-1990s can therefore be seen as a
typical mixture of (rather limited) financial support of businesses, non-interference with
business decision making, and wage restraint, against a background of consensus-making
rather than fierce competition. This typically Dutch variety of industrial governance could
perhaps be specified best by the somewhat paradoxical oxymoron of ‘laissez-faire
intervention’. That is, grant subsidies when large firms are in trouble (specific intervention),
but do not interfere with managerial practices (non-intervention), and for the remainder: trust
that wage restraint policies will do the job (generic intervention). More generally, the
corporatist form of governance also led to a welfare system that allowed firms to shed
thousands of workers without causing large-scale labour unrest. According to some observers,
9the extensive welfare system was arranged as a sort of implicit compensation for wage
restraints.
Pre-1982 steel: the case of Hoogovens, pt. 1
Hoogovens (in full: Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken or Royal Dutch
Blast Furnaces and Steel Plants) was established in the aftermath of World War I when Dutch
industrialists wished to decrease their almost total dependence on foreign imports of steel.
Backed by the Dutch government, which took a 25 per cent stake and gave its promise to
provide Hoogovens with cheap coal from its own mines, the City of Amsterdam, which took a
17 per cent stake in return for Hoogovens’s decision to locate in a coastal site near IJmuiden
(close to Amsterdam), and banks that were rather suddenly developing a taste for industrial
finance, production commenced in 1924 (Appendix Table B gives an overview of the central
government’s stakes in Hoogovens).
As we have seen, the industrialisation plans that were made following World War II
involved steel as a strategic industry and therefore Hoogovens as a strategic firm. Helped by
Marshall funds and funds provided by the Herstelbank, the firm was meant to become an
important supplier of steel to Dutch industry, especially shipbuilding. Government support
was so extensive that the state would have obtained a majority stake in Hoogovens if the
funds had gone straight into the firm. In order to prevent this, it was decided to set up a
formally separate firm, Breedband, which would be almost fully owned by the state. In
keeping with its non-interventionist ideology, however, the government decided to officially
delegate managerial authority to the Hoogovens management. Technically, Breedband would
be an indistinguishable part of Hoogovens as it would be totally integrated in the IJmuiden
works. Although this solution was pretty much unique, even for the Netherlands, it fittingly
symbolised the governance model of laissez-faire intervention, i.e. a form of governance in
which financial support was granted to strategic firms without a matching control over their
decisions.
The Breedband ‘division’ proved very successful. Demand for its flat-rolled products
was so favourable that by the 1960s Hoogovens felt that it might want to add another similar
rolling mill in the near future (Dankers and Verheul, 1993). However, such would make the
already complicated Breedband-State-Hoogovens construction even more so. Consequently,
Hoogovens opened negotiations for taking over Breedband in 1960. The acquisition was
realised in 1964. To the Dutch state, the Breedband sell-off turned out to be rather profitable
10
as it managed to negotiate a price that was more than five times the original investment
(during the preceding years, it had also received substantial dividends). As part of the deal,
the government also saw its stake in Hoogovens increase to 30 per cent.
Breedband’s production capacity was much larger than domestic consumption of its
products. Thus, Hoogovens got an incentive to conquer foreign markets which, incidentally,
was not too difficult as demand for flat products and coated steel (especially tin plate) was on
a fast increase everywhere in the developed economies. Besides, the firm had already been
more or less forced to focus on export markets, especially the US, as a result of strenuous
relationships with the Dutch shipbuilders’ purchasing co-operative during the late 1940s and
early 1950s (Dankers and Verheul, 1993). As a consequence, Hoogovens became the perhaps
most internationalised steel manufacturer of the EC (for later years, see Appendix Table C).
This had several effects. First, Hoogovens became accustomed to selling at world market
prices, which must have forced it to stress productive efficiency and product quality at a
relatively early stage. Secondly, the firm became a relative outsider to European policy cabals
which explains why Hoogovens could consistently maintain that survival in the European
steel industry should be more a matter of productive efficiency than of national predilections.
Finally, supplying many different export markets made Hoogovens less vulnerable to regional
problems of excess capacity.
Another decision that was to determine Hoogovens’s future to a large extent was taken
in the early 1960s, i.e. soon after huge natural gas reserves had been discovered in the
relatively backward north-eastern part of the country. Having learned that Billiton, a Dutch
firm active in the mining of bauxite in Suriname (one of the Netherlands’s former colonies),
was expecting to obtain energy supplies at discount prices in return of setting up a new
aluminium smelter in the north-east, it offered to bring in its technological expertise and
investment strength in a joint venture. After the government had, indeed, agreed to an
especially attractive pricing scheme for the supply of energy, Hoogovens and Billiton teamed
up with Alusuise, that had both technological and marketing knowledge on offer, to establish
Aldel in 1964. With a stake of fifty per cent, Hoogovens became the dominant party. It
proved the first step on the road that would lead to Hoogovens becoming, next to Japan’s
Kobe Steel, one of only two steel firms in the world with substantial interests in the
production of aluminium.
The acquisition of an aluminium branch seemed a just decision at the time as new
production techniques in major steel consuming industries were rapidly transforming input
requirements. For example, by 1985 in a typical US car model 44 per cent less steel and 65
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per cent less iron were used than in its precursor of 1975, but 81 per cent more aluminium
(see Table 4). More generally, the 1970s brought a departure from the long-term growth trend
that could not be attributed to cyclical factors. Between 1973 and 1980, consumption of steel
in advanced market economies fell by 13 per cent although GNP and industrial production
rose by about 15 per cent (Ballance and Sinclair, 1983).
***Table 4 about here***
In contradistinction to several of its bigger competitors, such as British Steel, Hoogovens
seems to have appreciated the structural changes rather well. Or was it just luck, triggered by
the availability of huge natural gas reserves and an industrial policy that wished to use these
reserves in part to the benefit of the relatively backward region under the surface of which
they were hidden? Indeed, according to De Voogd (1993), referring to an interview with
former Hoogovens CEO J.D. Hooglandt (member of the Board from 1970-1988), Hoogovens
did not appreciate the structural changes until the mid-1970s. Still, this was at least several
years earlier than the industry’s International Iron and Steel Institute that kept on forecasting a
growth of demand for well into the 1980s. In any event, Hoogovens appeared to be well-
equipped to confront the changes that were coming. Evidently, this would increase the
chances for laissez-faire intervention.
Unfortunately, this potential advantage appeared to be compromised significantly in
another area of the firm’s pursuits. In 1972, Hoogovens succumbed to the management
flavour of the time by merging with Germany’s Hoesch to form Estel. The third merger wave
of the century was going to demand another of its countless victims though on paper, as with
most mergers, the logic seemed impeccable at first. Following negotiations with the American
and British occupational forces, Hoogovens had managed to convert a pre-war stake it had in
Germany’s Phoenix steel works into a substantial minority stake in Dortmund-Hörde-
Hüttenunion (DHHU), one of the larger German steel firms that was created after the split-up
of Vereinigte Stahlwerke, in 1953. However, this participation proved to be problematic for
various reasons (see Dankers and Verheul, 1993). When Hoesch, also located in Dortmund,
proposed to take over DHHU via an exchange of shares, so that it would be able to rationalise
the Dortmund locations, this would release Hoogovens from a problem while obtaining part
of the proceeds if any of those would be forthcoming. Thus, in 1966, it agreed on the
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condition that the deal would also entail productive rationalisation among Hoesch and
Hoogovens. Hoesch’s inland site was supposed to specialise in the manufacture of down-
stream steel products whereas Hoogovens’s coastal site would focus on the production of
semi-finished steel, just like a text book would have it. The ECSC’s approval for the pseudo
cartel was obtained by invoking scale economy and rationalisation arguments, but according
to Dankers and Verheul (1993), it is quite remarkable that such arguments were only
occasionally used in internal Hoogovens documents, apparently because the Hoogovens
management was not so certain that the attendant effects would really be forthcoming. It was
not surprising, then, that the arrangement in actual fact hardly materialised.
The third merger wave of the century, peaking in the US around 1969, suggested the
ultimate—but in fact mostly illusory—solution to the typical problems of co-ordination in
alliances: merger. Thus, Hoogovens and Hoesch proceeded to form the first really
international steel firm in 1972. By size, the firms suddenly jumped to third place in Europe,
and it was believed that this would strengthen their position within EC negotiation processes
considerably. While this may have been true, it could not, of course, solve the major problem
of oligopolistic competition in capital-intensive industries, the pre-emptive creation of excess
capacity (see e.g. Cowling, 1982). Moreover, it only made things worse as teaming up with a
German major sucked Hoogovens into the problems of co-ordination that were manifest in the
largest steel market of Europe. On top of this, problems of style of management abounded.
These problems were not very different from those encountered by other merged firms, but
they were more visible as Hoesch and Hoogovens never formally integrated but built an
intermediate holding instead. This implied that strategic decisions still required the consent on
equal terms of the non-executive boards of both firms despite the fact that Hoogovens had a
factual majority share in Estel as a result of the minority stake in Hoesch which it had
negotiated as part of the DHHU-deal. Although this, at the time, was regarded a serious
failure (Dankers and Verheul, 1993), with hindsight it can only be concluded that it eventually
proved Hoogovens lucky. For it was now easier to break up the merger too.
As soon as the tide turned against expansive capacity investments during the steel
crisis of the second half of the 1970s, which was even before the new, expensive headquarters
could be inaugurated, the Estel merger started to show signs of fatigue. The tensions between
the constituent parts, that had never fully disappeared as each continued to operate as an
individual profit centre, now increased as decisions had to be made with respect to lay-offs
and closures instead of new investments. Evidently, Hoogovens was the more modern
subsidiary, but Hoesch was more closely linked to major markets, especially the car industry.
13
Thus, the recurrent question was which location was to undergo surgery. After having already
taken years of managerial inputs to implement the merger, now an additional input was
needed to manage iterative conflicts.
Probably the largest conflict concerned the significant losses that were incurred by
Hoesch. According to the merger arrangement, Estel was to cover up for these losses, which
in effect meant that Hoogovens had to take the burden. During 1981, Estel could no longer
carry the losses and applied for government support. The Dutch government was rather
willing to support Estel, but only on the condition that the German government on its part
would come up with a similar support. However, the Germans were only prepared to do so if
it was implied that the Estel restructuring would be part of a larger restructuring of the
German steel industry, in particular collaboration with Krupp. Since this would draw
Hoogovens even further into the loss-making parts of German steel, it finally decided, under
pressure from its Dutch banks including the successor to the Herstelbank, to try and abandon
Estel at as favourable conditions as possible. The Dutch government still tried to save the
merger but its efforts were later widely interpreted as meant to prevent high indemnity claims
from the German side which undoubtedly would have been issued if it had become clear that
the Dutch side had in fact been plotting the break-up of the merger. Since Hoogovens also
succeeded in leaving Hoesch to carry the can, Estel was dissolved by mutual consent in 1982,
exactly ten years after it had been established.
Thus, while the state had been instrumental in getting Hoogovens on the map, and in
re-establishing the firm after World War II, in part by taking large minority stakes, it had
refrained from substantive interference with decision making. Nevertheless, its indirect and
strategic support was substantial throughout the first thirty-five or so years following World
War II, probably even crucial when it was needed most, i.e. when a tough game of power had
to be played in the breaking up of Estel. Indeed, it is remarkable how well this game was
played by the Dutch side, i.e. how well-co-ordinated the government and Hoogovens’s
executive as well as non-executive board knew how to outsmart the German side.
***Table 5 about here***
Support in terms of direct subsidies, however, was comparatively small in size, especially
when expressed in terms of installed capacity (see Table 5). For example, during the five-year
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period of 1975-1979, the Dutch steel industry (i.e. Hoogovens) received the smallest amount
of government subsidies in the European Community, although this still amounted to about
DM 22 mln (approx. DGL 25 mln). As Table 5 also demonstrates, this was due to change
significantly during the 1980s, although financial state support still remained minor in a
comparative sense.
Post-1982 steel: the case of Hoogovens, pt. 2
A fault confessed is half redressed. Thus, following the break-up of Estel, a substantial
restructuring of Hoogovens should now correct what was called the ‘imbalance’ that had been
created in the IJmuiden works as Hoogovens and Hoesch had decided to focus IJmuiden on
the initial stages of production and the Dortmund location on the later stages of steel
production and finishing. A DGL 2.7 bln investment plan was presented to the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, of which the government pledged to finance almost a third by means of (a)
a subsidy of DGL 195 mln meant to undertake ‘strategic’ investments in IJmuiden; (b) a
subordinated loan of DGL 570 mln, on favourable terms, which was to be used to bridge the
debts from the Estel demerger; and (c) an addition to equity of DGL 130 mln, unless the
capital market would be able to carry an offering to this amount (Dankers and Verheul, 1993).
In addition to this, the Dutch government set apart an amount of DGL 150 mln as a
contingency loan to be used in case this was ‘deemed necessary’.
The arrangement signalled, for the first time, a much increased role of the government
in Hoogovens’s decision making. First, the government’s right on information was stepped up
substantially. Second, it was awarded the right to veto important decisions. Thus, Hoogovens
was required to report to the Ministry on a monthly basis, and was not allowed to take certain
decisions without government consent, ranging from lay-offs to executive pay. The Ministry,
however, never made use of the also agreed, but heavily contested, possibility of appointing a
surveillant in the firm’s board in addition to the two government representatives, both high-
ranking civil servants, which it already had on the non-executive board. As far as known, the
government never really blocked proposals from the firm.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Finance started complaining about the gainful energy-deal
that had been arranged earlier between Aldel and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The
Finance ministry argued that the support measures that had been taken in the aftermath of the
Estel break-up were so lucrative that it was about time to redress the energy-support that it
calculated at DGL 150 million annually. To Hoogovens, however, that was unacceptable. It
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replied that it was prepared, and willing, to give up its aluminium business if the Finance
ministry were to get its own way. Obviously, to the Ministry of Economic Affairs such would
mean both a loss of inter-departmental esteem and a possible setback to its regional policy for
the north-east, so it kept on backing Hoogovens in the dispute. Through intervention of the
Prime Minister a deal was struck that implied that the energy price support would be adapted
(downward) to the prices paid by Aldel’s foreign competitors, especially Péchiney.
Interestingly, as has already been noted above, Péchiney was operating in the
Netherlands too, making extensive use of electricity generated by the Netherlands’s only
substantial nuclear plant. Both in the Netherlands and in its home country France it was
benefiting enormously from the huge subsidies that had been, and still were, granted to
nuclear energy facilities. As a consequence, adapting the energy prices could not possibly
amount to very much so that Hoogovens and the Ministry of Economic Affairs could be
certain that they had concluded an arrangement that would be favourable to them. As a matter
of fact, the various support measures remained effective indeed.
As if to prove the Ministry of Economic Affairs right, Hoogovens’s performance
improved so much during the following years that a public offering in 1984 was successful.
As Appendix Table A demonstrates, 1984 was the first of three consecutive years during
which Hoogovens would realise positive net returns whereas cash flows had already improved
substantially. Consequently, the government did not need to fully implement its pledge of
equity support nor was it necessary for Hoogovens to break into the promised contingency
loan. Following its newly acquired privatisation policy (see above), the state even sold off a
substantial part of its stake in Hoogovens in 1986, thus reducing its ownership to 15 per cent.
By the end of that year, state ownership was effectively at 13.5 per cent (see Appendix Table
B).
Part of the performance improvement was due to the fact that Hoogovens had
introduced the more efficient method of continuous casting that had been in use in other
countries already since the 1970s. This late adoption allowed Hoogovens to comply rather
painlessly with the EC’s capacity reduction demands as it simply closed down several of its
outdated facilities. Besides, being relatively late in one respect normally creates a chance to
reap first-mover advantages in another when technological development has meanwhile
continued. Indeed, Hoogovens became the first steel manufacturer to successfully introduce
computer-integrated manufacturing (Dankers and Verheul, 1993). Consequently, a smaller but
state-of-the-art steel works was born.
Thus, Hoogovens succeeded in improving its performance considerably at the same
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time that Europe was going through a severe steel crisis. While government support was
crucial at the time that Hoogovens wished to give up its merger with Hoesch, much of the
improvement was the result of internal restructuring. As can be seen from Appendix Table A,
the restructuring of Hoogovens—rather than the steel crisis of the early 1980s as such—took
its toll from labour. Between 1982 and 1986, approximately 3,000 jobs were shed in
Hoogovens’s steel division while production volumes declined substantially only from 1981
to 1982. This reduction in employment of approximately 14 per cent was almost fully realised
without forced dismissals. Sheltered by the Polder Model’s corporatist agreement structure,
special redundancy and early retirement schemes were set up that softened the pain to a
certain extent. During the second half of the 1980s similar redundancy packages were agreed
which allowed Hoogovens to axe another 2000 jobs in a further drive to increase productivity.
Steel production volumes remained almost stable.
Hoogovens’s policy of diversification into high value-added markets was probably not
much different from its rivals so that it is unlikely to have contributed to the firm’s relatively
good performance. Moreover, it was partly abandoned when rather suddenly an opportunity
rose to acquire Kaiser’s European aluminium businesses from its troubled US parent in 1987.
While aluminium had remained a suppositious activity for a long time, especially during the
Estel troubles, Hoogovens jumped at the chance to become a major player—only a few years
after it had shown itself prepared to sell off its aluminium activities altogether (see above).
Together with modernisation and extension of its own facilities (such as those at its Sidal
subsidiary in Belgium), the acquisition of Kaiser Europe made Hoogovens the no. 4
aluminium producer in Europe. Total production increased twofold and in 1988 Hoogovens’s
aluminium activities made up only a bit less than 35 per cent of total sales. Hoogovens
therefore more or less stumbled into a so-called two-metals strategy, a strategy which,
however, served it well, at least until the early 1990s.
The largest lay-offs occurred during the steel crisis of the early 1990s. About 4,000
steel jobs were lost before employment picked up again in 1995. Paradoxically, however,
Hoogovens’s steel production volumes increased throughout the crisis-years. Thus, the lay-
offs were obviously a result of intensified down-sizing efforts. Again, the Polder Model
proved its effectiveness for Hoogovens, as society as a whole carried large parts of the burden
by hiding many of the employees that were sacked in social welfare arrangements including
disability facilities.
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Assessment
Polder-type governance during the second half of the twentieth century consisted of  specific
support, both financially and strategically, to several large firms deemed to be important to
the Dutch economy. Such support was not accompanied by a concomitant share of
government in firm decision making and can therefore be classified as ‘laissez-faire
intervention’. Polder-type governance did not entail development programmes based on
industrial blue prints, but left firms to decide whether to expand or contract. Such decision
making, however, was surrounded by government policies that stressed the importance of
international competitiveness. Since the Dutch economy was (and is) heavily dependent on
exports, it follows that wage restraint was likely to become an important policy goal. More
generally, the Polder Model started out with guided wage policies and evolved to implicit or
even explicit agreements under which labour and employers agreed on wage restraint in return
for jobs and attractive welfare arrangements.
In the case of Dutch steel, this type of governance was able to successfully cope with
decline. Although Hoogovens right from its beginnings has been partially owned by the Dutch
state, it has always been allowed to behave as if it were a fully private company apart from a
brief period during the first half of the 1980s when it had to recuperate from its broken-up
merger with Hoesch. The government rather anxiously avoided obtaining a majority stake.
Still, it was evident to all parties concerned that Hoogovens could always count on
governmental support, in terms of subsidies but perhaps especially in terms of strategy and
negotiation support as during the break-up of Estel and the cheap-energy dispute with the
Ministry of Finance. Although not insignificant, financial support was comparatively small in
size.
More generally, Hoogovens benefited from the Polder Model in two respects. First,
wage restraint allowed the firm to offer its output abroad at relatively attractive prices.
Second, it allowed Hoogovens to axe several thousands of jobs without causing serious labour
unrest. In fact, forced dismissals were only necessary during the steel crisis of the early 1990s,
but by that time the imminent economic boom did not require special arrangements to manage
decline in terms of employment. In terms of output, there hardly was a decline.
When seen from a somewhat broader perspective, however, all that glisters is not gold.
First, wage restraints can lead to intermittent wage adaptations (so-called explosions) which
firms may find difficult to cope with. What happened to the Dutch economy during the 1960s
serves as a textbook case in this respect. Second, as Kleinknecht (1998) has argued, one of the
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probable effects of the Dutch emphasis on wage restraint has been that innovation has
remained lacklustre as firms were not sufficiently encouraged to find new means of
productivity increase. By implication, this must have slowed down the modernisation of the
Dutch economy. In the case of Hoogovens, we have indeed observed that the continuous
casting innovation was introduced relatively late. Since purchasing power increased only
slightly, as we have seen, consumers were also slack in adopting new products which must
have had a discouraging effect on the introduction of new products and services too. The
presence of many cartels and semi-cartels may have reduced incentives to improve
technologies and services even further. When added to the penchants of industrial policies for
sun-set industries and firms, the combined retardation effects may have been quite impressive.
Perhaps this explains why it took so long before the Dutch economy as a whole got back on a
growth trajectory.
Third, the success of laissez-faire intervention heavily relies on the presence of
‘adequate’ management in the firms that receive support. If formal ex ante assessments of
management and business policies remain at bay, this must imply that chance becomes a
crucial determinant of policy success. Indeed, while several other similarly supported firms
subsided (such as RSV shipbuilders, and Fokker Aircraft Manufacturers in the 1990s, both
eminent examples of bad management), the Hoogovens support turned out to be a success just
because this particular firm happened to make several ‘right’ policy choices, albeit partly
forced by circumstances (export focus and break-up of Estel) and partly by accident
(continued involvement in the aluminium industry). Thus, it could easily have been otherwise.
The paper therefore suggests that if firms are concentrating on the basics of business,
instead of indulging themselves in all sorts of fashionable behaviour such as mergers and
downsizing, Polder-type governance may be a good approach. However, many firms choose
to adapt their behaviour to what they think will be appreciated by the stock market.
Unfortunately, there is perhaps no other economic institution that is so dependent on fads and
fashions than the stock market.
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Table 1 Top-10 and selected largest steel producers, 1998
World
rank
Production
(mln tonnes)
World
rank
Production
(mln tonnes)
1 Posco
(Rep. of Korea)
25.6 15 Bethlehem Steel
(USA)
9.6
2 Nippon Steel
(Japan)
25.1 18 Nucor
(USA)
8.8
3 Corus
(UK)
23.0 19 Cherepovets
(Russia)
8.5
4 Arbed
(Luxembourg)
20.1 23 Magnitogorsk
(Russia)
7.7
5 Usinor
(France)a
18.9 24 LTV
(USA)
7.4
6 LNM
(UK)
17.1 25 Cockerill Sambre
(Belgium)a
6.7
(6) British Steel
(UK)
16.3 (25) Hoogovens
(Netherlands)
6.7
7 Thyssen Krupp
(Germany)
14.8 26 Novolipetsk
(Russia)
6.6
8 Riva
(Italy)
13.3 40 Mariupol
(Ukraine)
4.3
9 NKK
(Japan)
11.5 44 Huta Katowice
(Poland)
4.1
10 USX
(USA)
11.0 56 SSAB
(Sweden)
3.4
a Cockerill owned for 75% by Usinor since late-1998
Sources: IISI; Hoogovens; British Steel
Table 2 Income, wages, and labour costs in the Netherlands, 1984-1996  (percentage growth)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP 4.9 4.9 2.8 0.7 3.9 5.9 6.6 5.0 4.2 2.8 5.3 3.9 4.1
Real National Income 2.7 3.7 3.3 -0.2 2.5 5.6 4.4 1.9 1.0 0.9 3.8 2.3 3.1
Standard purchasing power -1.1 1.5 2.4 1.5 1.1 2.1 2.4 0.2 0.5 0.6 -0.4 0.9 0.2
Standard gross wage 0.3 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.4 2.9 3.5 4.3 3.1 1.8 1.4 1.6
Real labour costs 0.7 0.2 -0.7 0.7 -0.7 -0.9 1.8 2.8 2.7 1.6 0.9 1.0 0.6
Source: Van Witteloostuijn (1999) from CPB
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Table 3 Development of wages in selected OECD countries, 1986-1990
Country
Average annual
wage increase Country
Average annual
wage increase
Austria 5.0 Italy 6.1
Belgium 3.0 Japan 3.7
Denmark 6.0 Netherlands 1.7
Finland 8.2 Norway 8.7
France 3.7 Spain 8.2
Germany 4.2 Sweden 8.2
Greece 16.0 UK 8.5
Ireland 5.6 USA 2.6
Source: OECD (1993)
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Table 4 Inputs of materials for US-built cars, 1975-1985 (in pounds)
1975 1980 1985 % change
1975-85
Steel 2,420 1,834 1,356 –44
Iron 626 458 216 –65
Plastics 168 184 252 +50
Rubber 160 124 180 +13
Aluminium 86 124 156 +81
Glass 94 80 72 –22
All others 416 276 168 –60
Total car weight 3,970 3,080 2,400 –40
Source: Ballance & Sinclair (1983) from Arthur Andersen & Co; Business Week, 15 June 1981
Table 5 Subsidies to the steel industry in selected EU countries, 1975-1985*
Average
installed
capacity
(1000 tons)
Average annual
subsidy
(mln DM)
Average annual
subsidy per
1000 tons
installed
capacity
(DM)
Average
installed
capacity
(1000 tons)
Average annual
subsidy
(mln DM)
Average annual
subsidy per
1000 tons
installed
capacity
(DM)
Average annual
subsidy per
1000 tons
installed
capacity
(DM)
1975-1979 1980-1985 1975-1985
                                          ________________________________                             ________________________________                        ______
Ireland 107 15.2 142,056 267 103.5 387,641 276,012
United Kingdom 28,396 2,770.4 97,563 25,035 2,212.5 88,376 92,552
Italy 34,636 865.4 24,985 38,943 4,719.5 121,193 77,462
France 32,930 412.0 12,511 29,249 3,585.8 122,598 72,559
Belgium 19,300 545.0 28,238 17,138 1,669.5 97,415 65,971
Denmark 1,097 23.0 20,966 1,067 31.8 29,844 25,809
Luxembourg 7,764 6.6 850 6,238 247.5 39,674 22,027
Netherlands 7,787 4.4 565 8,272 178.8 21,620 12,050
Germany 66,812 184.0 2,754 60,743 1,053.3 17,340 10,710
Total 198,811 4,826.4 24,276 189,550 13,802.3 72,816 50,752
*  ranked by position in last column
Source: own calculations from Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie (1986; 1987; 1990)
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Appendix Table A Basic Indicators of Hoogovens
Employees
Steel
Division
Employees
Aluminium
Division
Steel
production
(x1000 tons)
Net revenue
(x1 mln DGL)
Cash flow
(x1 mln DGL)
Net return
(x1 mln DGL)
1980 na na 4953 5743 237 -274
1981 na na 5178 6451 151 -394
1982 20655 na 4122 5943 365 -106
1983 20080 na 4277 6048 315 -38
1984 19379 na 5532 7259 867 207
1985 19214 na 5302 7465 688 279
1986 17569 3604 5052 6093 628 155
1987 16988 6831 4836 5848 416 -76
1988 16632 7116 5260 7868 963 301
1989 16307 6607 5419 9011 1718 751
1990 15687 6713 5180 8429 867 298
1991 15074 6490 4943 8095 551 -51
1992 14215 5994 5197 7722 476 -595
1993 12092 4535 5812 7219 474 -234
1994 11601 4591 5949 7934 786 354
1995 12714 4556 6149 8100 1173 507
1996 12234 4975 6171 7933 812 326
1997 15912 5161 6674 9996 647 498
1998 15631 5283 6725 10811 1117 415
Note: employee figures excluding non-steel and non-aluminium employees (on average 2250 employees during
1994-1998)
Source: Annual Reports Hoogovens
Appendix Table B Government ownership of Hoogovens *
1924 1961 1964 1979 1984 1986 1987 1990 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998
Stake (%) 25 27 30 29 29 13.5 14 12.3 15.5 15.3 13 10.2 10
Paid value (m DGL) 7.5 na na 74.3 92.4 54.0 54.0 55.0 97.5 97.5 97.5 97.5 97.5
Note: when Hoogovens was founded, the City of Amsterdam also held a significant (17%) share of Hoogovens’s stock (see text) but this was gradually reduced to
approx. 8.5% in 1982 and further to 5% just before it was sold off in 1993.
* only years during which mutations occurred
Source: Dutch Ministry of Finance
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Appendix Table C Steel exports as a percentage of steel production*
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
EU 39 40 42 44 43 43 41 43 43 44
Hoogovens 75 77 81 81 83 82 82 80 82 83
* EU: extra-EU exports plus intra-EU imports as a percentage of total ferrous metals production
expressed in current prices. Hoogovens: exports as a percentage of total production expressed in
tonnes
Source: own calculations from CEC (1993); Dankers and Verheul (1993)
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